Eighteenth Armed Forces Day was celebrated by the Republic of China in September. Observance of such anniversaries is a modern custom. Origins of the Chinese Army are lost in antiquity. In the 15th century, Admiral Cheng Ho was leading the Chinese Navy across half of the known world—all the way from the South Seas to the coast of Africa. The Air Force traces its beginnings to the 1920s. Chinese pilots did well against the Japanese in the early stages of the War of Resistance (1937-45). Japanese planes were destroyed on the ground at Taipei and anti-war leaflets were dropped over the Japanese islands.
Young troops of the Manchu "New Army" provided the military backbone which destroyed the Ch'ing dynasty in the National Revolution and established the Republic of Sun Yat-sen and the Three Principles of the People. The "New Army" was trained in methods of modern warfare—a step which the Manchus had long resisted. Conventional Chinese forces were not entirely replaced at the birth of the Republic, however. The armies of the warlords remained in the field in many provinces. Military provincialism remained a sizable obstacle in the path of a united and democratic nation.
In a real sense, therefore, the Armed Forces of the Republic of China might be thought of as dating to June 16, 1924. That was the day on which Dr. Sun opened the Whampoa Military Academy near Canton. The need for a trained officer corps loyal to the Central Government had long been apparent. Decision to establish the Academy was made by the Congress of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) in January of 1924. Dr. Sun was strongly favorable. The only name mentioned for commandant was that of Chiang Kai-shek.
Original plans called for an enrollment of 300 but applications totaled 3,000. Examinations were given and 500 cadets were admitted. The first course was brief but intensive. The second class numbered 400. The period of training was lengthened as the immediate need for a corps of trained officers became less pressing.
Early months were filled with difficulty. Funds and equipment were lacking. Not all the instructors were competent. General Chiang gave all his time and energy to the Academy. He took up his residence at the school and accepted the regimen required of the cadets. He was up at 5 and policed his own quarters. Rounds of inspection followed. The future President was a hard taskmaster but asked no more of his charges than of himself.
As Hollington Tong recalls, "Despite his strict discipline, he was extremely popular among the students. This is hardly surprising, in view of the close interest which he took in their personal problems. To those who were in financial straits he extended assistance. Chiang desired the cadets to be not only good soldiers, but good Party members as well, and he invited Hu Han-min, Liao Chung-kai and Tai Chi-tao to deliver lectures at the Academy on economics, politics and the Three People's Principles."
Communists made trouble from the outset. Both faculty and cadet corps included members of the Communist Party. Communists established an organization of their own, the Union of Military Youth. An attempt to restore unity was made with the Sun Yat-sen Society. So obstructive were the Communists, however, that they finally had to be expelled. When Chiang Kai-shek organized the First Army Corps, which was under his personal command, he carefully chose as officers only those who had not been infected with the leftist virus.
Whampoa cadets were enlisted to oppose reactionaries as well as leftists. Merchants of Canton had organized a private army to protect their interests. This Merchants' Volunteer Corps began to intrigue for the overthrow of Sun Yat-sen. Chiang Kai-shek and his corps of cadets disarmed the private army and nipped the plot in the bud.
Unification of China under the Republic was accomplished by Chiang Kai-shek in the Northward Expedition of 1926-28. The National Government named Chiang commander-in-chief and gave him a virtually free hand in conduct of the campaign. His junior officers came from Whampoa and were advocates of the People's Principles of Nationalism, Democracy and Social Welfare. Chiang Kai-shek imposed a system of personal responsibility. If a company retreated, its commander was shot. The same went for battalions, regiments, divisions and army corps. A political department was attached to the Army to promote political education of the troops and of civil populations in liberated areas. Representatives of the Kuomintang were attached to each army corps.
Defeat of the warlords did not mean the pacification of China. The Communists (some of whom had studied military science at the feet of Chiang at Whampoa) had never ceased to resist the Republic. Various expeditions were sent against them. By the close of 1934, their resistance was virtually ended. Starting in Kiangsi, the Communists undertook a march of retreat in which they suffered defeat after defeat. The remnant which reached a bleak northern part of Shensi province in October of 1935 constituted little threat to the Republic and the National Government. Chiang Kai-shek was increasingly compelled to turn his attention to the Japanese menace and to the measures necessary to contain it. For the moment, the Communists were left undisturbed in their Paoan hideout. Their proffers of loyalty and cooperation in the struggle of Japan were accepted at face value.
Japan had begun active aggression against China in 1931. Knowing that the Chinese Armed Forces were not ready to face such a formidable opponent, Chiang Kai-shek had temporized in order to buy time. By 1937 the Chinese Army stood at 1.7 million, the Chinese Navy at 59 ships totaling 51,000 tons and the Air Force at 200 planes (General Claire Chennault placed the aircraft count at only 91).
The Japanese knew that China's strength was increasing and that world opinion was running against them. They wanted war as quickly as possible. Japanese troops were maneuvering in the vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge 15 miles southeast of Peiping. According to the Japanese, one of their soldiers was missing. Forces went out to find him and, Japan claimed, were fired upon by Chinese troops. The Japanese immediately began an attack on the detachment of Chinese 29th Army troops stationed at Wanping. China's attempts to stop the fighting were unavailing. The Japanese had their excuse. Twenty thousand Japanese troops were rushed into the Peiping area within six days and reinforcements were sent from Japan. The Japanese occupied Peiping and Tientsin under pretext of "protecting the people."
Chiang Kai-shek called on the Armed Forces to implement his strategy of "trading space for time." The enemy was to be made to pay dearly for everything he gained. Scorched earth tactics would leave neither shelter nor food for the invaders. Japan would be drawn deeper and deeper into the interior, her lines of communication and transportation lengthened and her forces spread thin. In the end this was the strategy which saved China and won the war.
The battles fought and won by the Armed Forces against Japan were detailed in these pages (August issue) by General Ho Ying-chin. Communists participated in no major campaigns. They conserved manpower and weapons for the postwar struggle against the National Government.
During eight years of war, the Armed Forces fought 40,070 battles against the Japanese, of which 1,117 were major engagements and 22 were big battles. Materiel provided by the Americans and made in China was used up in combat. The Chinese forces were decimated and tired. This was the moment for which the Communists had been waiting. They armed themselves with weapons which the Russians had captured from the Japanese in Manchuria and made their bid for power.
There were a number of reasons for the success of the Chinese Communist forces in the late 1940s: war weariness of the National Government's forces, the discontinuance of U.S. economic and military assistance, American encouragement of coalition government, differences of opinion within the National Government and the Kuomintang, runaway inflation and the misleading of some people by Communist propaganda.
Militarily, the Armed Forces of the Republic were never destroyed. President and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had seen the danger and prepared the island province of Taiwan as a redoubt and bastion for counterattack and national recovery. The bulk of the Navy and the Air Force reached Taiwan to fight again. Sizable elements of the Army did, too. Those writers who have described these Armed Forces as "defeated and demoralized" were parroting Communist propaganda, not reporting fact.
From the beginning of the Taiwan phase, President Chiang knew that rebuilding of the Armed Forces would be the key to survival of a free island province and buildup of a base from which to strike back at the Communists. This had to have first priority. But it was also necessary to make Taiwan strong economically, socially and culturally so as to provide the essential support for the military.
Morale was given great impetus in 1949 when the Chinese Communists tried to storm the offshore island complex of Kinmen (Quemoy) and failed. The invading force was annihilated. These islands along with Matsu to the north were quickly fortified and reinforced. Heavy Communist shellings were weathered in 1954. Then, in 1958, the Communists undertook a saturation artillery barrage in the hope of softening up Kinmen for an amphibious assault. The invasion never came. Defenders dug in and stood firm. Supplies went through the withering fire, although at heavy cost. The countering fire never ceased. In the end, the enemy was reduced to the absurdity of his odd-day lobbing of anywhere from a handful to a few dozen propaganda shells over Kinmen. Matsu also remained an indomitable symbol of the Armed Forces' defense against aggression.
President Chiang began to rebuild the Armed Forces as soon as he reached Taiwan. Manpower was not a problem. Islanders had their homes to fight for and no stomach for Communism. But weaponry was obsolescent and often beyond repair. The chief executive saw that the next battle would have to be fought on the political front. Americans had to be convinced of their stake in free China, the National Government and the bastion of Taiwan.
As the Korean War broke out in June of 1950, President Chiang offered to contribute such troops as could be spared from the defense of Taiwan. The offer was politely declined—not that the Chinese forces were not wanted or could not have been useful, but on grounds that their presence might bring Chinese Communists into the conflict. The Chinese Reds made their move anyway some months later. Free Chinese forces did not fight in Korea but the President had made his point about the importance of Taiwan and the maintenance of the Republic of China as an alternative to the tyranny which had descended on the mainland.
By 1951, the United States had decided that military assistance to the Republic of China should be resumed. The American Military Assistance Advisory Group/China was instituted. U.S. surplus arms were made available to the ROC and funds provided for the purchase of planes, tanks, missiles and the other paraphernalia of war. The Navy was reinforced. The Air Force was given planes to match the speed and maneuverability of opposing MIGs.
Taiwan arsenals turn out shells, other ammunition. (File photo)
In the mid-1960s, the Chinese Armed Forces embarked on a five-year expansion and improvement program to promote the quality of personnel, modernize equipment, strengthen combat strength and put all services on a footing of instant readiness for the supreme test.
The Army kept closer watch on the organization, equipment and tactics of the enemy and made sure that its weapons were not inferior. Firepower, mobility and logistical support were stressed. Missile, aviation and airborne units were established. The management function was streamlined and simplified. An Army Combat Development Command was set up for purposes of integration. The Army Training Command brought about unified supervision of schools and unit training.
Warship replacement was the principal goal of the Navy during this period of buildup. The seagoing forces strengthened escort, antisubmarine, mine warfare and amphibious operations. The Navy acquired increased capacity for supplying its logistics and for repairing and maintaining its equipment. Emphasis was placed on the Marine Corps, which is the world's second largest after that of the United States, and its amphibious capabilities were brought to a peak.
The Air Force had to have better planes and it got them. It also acquired outstanding pilots through the intensification of training. Bases were enlarged and airstrips lengthened. Communications training was expanded and brought up to date. Transport functions were not neglected because of the stress on combat. Operational control was tightened and antiaircraft defenses perfected. The Air Force has seen more post-1949 combat than any other service and has not been found wanting.
Combined Service Forces acquired computers and learned how to use them in providing the Armed Forces with its logistical needs quickly and with a minimum of bureaucratic fumbling. At the outset, the Armed Forces were dependent on imports for almost everything they used. Now many basic items are made in Taiwan and distributed by CSF.
The Armed Forces are unalterably dedicated to the proposition that today's fighting man must be well educated. The Whampoa spirit has not disappeared in the schooling of the officer corps. Army, Navy and Air Force Academies attract the cream of the nation's youth. Their graduates become the professional core of the services. Augmentation is available from the ranks of college graduates, although possession of a bachelor's degree no longer automatically assures a young man of a commission. Noncommissioned officers are specially and specifically educated. Candidates are carefully chosen from among junior middle school graduates. They receive military training and also complete senior middle school. The elite sergeant corps of the Chinese Armed Forces is no place for dropouts.
Troop training is thorough and realistic. Selective service assures that all able-bodied young men receive military training and serve their country in the regular forces and subsequently in the reserves. Summer training of reserves is mandatory and assures a reservoir of soldiery several times larger than the regular forces.
Increased emphasis has been placed on political warfare as the result of lessons learned on the mainland and the experience of the Korean and Vietnamese wars. A political warfare unit of the Army has served in South Vietnam for several years. Members of the Armed Forces receive political training both individually and in groups. Pamphlets and booklets have been prepared. Particular attention is given to follow-up activities. News is regularly released to civilian publications and press conferences held. Extensive cooperation is given to Taiwan's three television networks in their coverage of military affairs.
Relations with the civil population are unexcelled. There is a code of conduct for assistance at harvest time, in typhoon and other disasters and in the conduct of winter relief. Cultural troupes are sent to cities, towns and the outlying islands. The Armed Forces are the principal supporters of Chinese Opera.
Military government experiments have been carried out in Kinmen and Matsu. These successes equipped the Armed Forces for governmental duties during the period of mainland recovery.
Veterans' resettlement under the Vocational Assistance Commission for Retired Servicemen is an outstanding accomplishment. Taiwan has no unemployed and disabled former servicemen roaming the streets or making trouble because their livelihood is no longer a matter of concern. Hospitalization is available. There are homes for the disabled. But most veterans want jobs. VACRS organizations and enterprises have provided jobs by the tens of thousands. There is scarcely an endeavor in which former servicemen do not participate. They are fishermen and foresters. They grow deciduous fruit in the high mountains. They build highways in Thailand. Of those who can and want to work, none is unemployed.
U.S. Ambassador to Taipei Walter P. McConaughy recalled the 1951 resumption of American military assistance to the Republic of China on Taiwan in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad in November of 1969.
"Given our historic ties with the Republic of China, going back to its inception in 1911 and the fact that we were World War II allies, we could not have deserted it when the Government was forced by the Communist takeover of the mainland to retreat to the island of Taiwan in 1949," Ambassador McConaughy said. "Then as now the Chinese Communist leaders pledged themselves to destroy its rival and to 'liberate' Taiwan. Then as now their military capabilities for fulfilling that threat far outdistanced those available to the Republic of China.
"In addition, Communist China's open hostility toward the United States, apparent from the time it gained control of the mainland and undiminished by the passing years, and Peking's entry into the Korean war underscored the importance of Taiwan remaining in friendly hands. Lying midway along the offshore island chain stretching from Japan to Indonesia, Taiwan occupies a strategic position, not only in military terms but in respect to the lines of communication and trade which are important to the continued development of the East Asian region as a whole.
"Such considerations lay behind our decision to assist the Republic of China in its defense, and they continue to determine the character and extent of our military relationship with the Chinese Government. Under the Mutual Defense Assistance agreement which entered into force on February 9, 1951, and as amended in the following year, we initiated a program to provide military material 'for the defense of Taiwan against possible attack' and to give advisory assistance in rebuilding the Republic of China's military forces so that they could play an effective role in that defense. That assistance is continuing but at substantially reduced levels, and the Republic of China has been assuming a larger and larger share of its own defense burden. In an effort to prevent a further increase in military expenditures, already quite large in relation to the total budget, as well as to permit a modest modernization program, the Chinese Government has embarked on a program of force reorganization and some reduction.
"Our basic commitment to the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan was made in the Mutual Defense Treaty of December 2, 1954, in which each government recognizes 'that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against the territories of either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.'"
Ambassador McConaughy pointed out that on January 29, 1955, a joint resolution of Congress authorized the president of the United States to employ American armed forces to insure "the security and protection of such related positions and territories in the area of Formosa and the Pescadores as are now in friendly hands (the islands of Kinmen or Quemoy and Matsu) and the taking of other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores."
The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group/China started its work with a handful of advisers in 1951 and reached peak strength of 2,347 in 1955. Thereafter, as the ROC Armed Forces increased in strength and weaponry, the number of MAAG personnel declined. MAAG/China had 242 people in the spring of 1972 and this included only 18 field advisers. Maj. Gen. John W. Barnes, chief of the U.S. defense team in Taiwan, said in mid-1972 that Taiwan's defenses were in good hands but that the Republic of China had too much "equipment of vintage stock and this significantly affects combat capabilities." The Republic of China continues to need U.S. foreign military sales credit loans, excess weapons and grant aid to assure armed forces which can cope with the Chinese Communist threat, he said.
The Republic of China now pays 97 per cent of its own way militarily, the highest figure for any Asian ally of the United States. But because 95 per cent of the budget must be allocated to operations and maintenance, funds are insufficient for the procurement of sufficient modern equipment and systems.
To those who have said that the Republic of China "can go it alone" militarily, General Barnes replied, "She can't. Not yet."
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the U.S. joint chiefs of staff, testifying in 1972, urged the House Foreign Affairs Committee to approve continued military assistance to the ROC, "which provides the United States with military basing and staging areas." The weakness of ROC forces, he said, "lies in the lack of modern equipment" and continued reliance on "obsolete World War II and Korean War" weapons.
The United States wanted to help modernize the free Chinese armed forces in fiscal 1972, Admiral Moorer said, but reduction of Congressional appropriations prevented. For fiscal 1973, he asked funds for communications equipment, essential operations, maintenance items and training.
Congressional authorization requests submitted by Secretary of State William Rogers called for $15 million in military grant aid, $55 million in military credit sales and surplus equipment valued at $46.5 million for the 1972-73 fiscal year.
U.S. military assistance to the Republic of China averaged more than $200 million a year through the 1950s, then fell to the level of $85-$95 million from 1961 through 1967. Grant aid averaged about $50 million a year until 1968, when the amount was cut to $30 million. Grants totaled $17 million in fiscal 1969 and 1970 and only $3 million in 1971.
The Republic of China has Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Combined Service Forces totaling some 550,000 men.
The newly streamlined "forward look" Army is charged with the defense of Kinmen and Matsu as well as Taiwan and has substantial forces on the heavily fortified offshore islands. Weapons include M-41 tanks, M-14 rifles, Nike-Hercules and Hawk missiles, artillery, mortars and various small arms.
The Navy has some 150 vessels, including destroyers. Most are patrol or amphibious craft. More than half of the naval force belongs to the Marine Corps.
Air Force F-86 Saberjets shot down 32 Communists aircraft in the 1958 Battle of Kinmen with the loss of only one plane. The F-86F is still a work horse of the CAF, which has limited numbers of F-100s, F-104s and F-5s. Air Force commanders are hoping to phase out the Korean War F-86 in favor of the F-5 or preferably the F-4 Phantom.
The Combined Services Forces, a unique military organization, includes personnel from all branches of the Armed Forces and supplying all services. The CSF has factory and arsenal systems, acts as armed forces paymaster and housekeeper; provides food and quarters and fulfills many administrative functions.
CSF operates four arsenals producing small caliber weapons and ammunition ranging from 30 caliber balls to 155 millimeter artillery rounds. Under its jurisdiction are three clothing factories and plants making rubber products and batteries. Cartography of the CSF map service is equal to that of the United States at much lower cost. M-14 rifles, M-60 machine guns, AN/PRC-77 radios and vehicles are made in cooperation with the United States.
Arsenals of the Combined Service Forces supply most training and operational requirements for ammunition, small arms, mortars, artillery and automotive parts.
Products of co-production have included more than 3,100 2 1/2-ton multi-fuel engine trucks and more than 2,000 M151 quarter-ton jeeps. This program is enabling the Armed Forces to replace their World War II vehicle fleet.
Already in the air over Taiwan are UH-1-H helicopters—the versatile choppers of Vietnam—manufactured in the co-production program.
Some of free China's weapons have come from U.S. property disposal yards in South Vietnam. Equipment not economically recoverable by the United States is shipped to Taiwan in the Navy's LST's and returned to usefulness by skilled mechanics working at reasonable wages. Items include small arms and 8-inch howitzers, ammunition and M-41 tanks, spare parts and aircraft, engineer equipment and destroyers.
The ROC repair and rebuild capacity became so outstanding that the United States entered into contracts for the repair and maintenance of material from Vietnam. Taiwan labor costs were estimated at a tenth of those in the United States. To this must be added savings in shipping distance, handling charges and time.
Commanding officers of MAAG have been consistent advocates of stronger free Chinese Armed Forces. Maj. Gen. Richard G. Ciccolella, who preceded General Barnes as MAAG chief, helped establish the helicopter plant and recommended submarines and up-to-date aircraft for the ROC. Submarines have not yet been approved by the U.S. Congress but ROC Navy personnel are taking submarine training at New London, Connecticut.
The United States has no combat infantry forces on Taiwan. The Formosa Defense Command was established in 1952. This became the Taiwan Defense Command in November of 1955. It is a unified command directly under the U.S. Commander-in-Chief Pacific but has no U.S. military units under its direct control. The commander of USTDC, a vice admiral, has the primary mission of planning the defense of Taiwan, the Pescadores and the offshore islands. A secondary mission is to be prepared to conduct any operations directed by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific.
The principal U.S. Air Force representative on Taiwan is the 327th Air Division, which is subordinate to the 13th Air Force with headquarters at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. The 405th Fighter Wing has a detachment at Tainan Air Base in the southern part of the island. The Ching Chuan Kang Air Base at Taichung was expanded and a 12,000-foot runway installed to serve the 314th Tactical Airlift Wing. This unit provides an intra-theater airlift for the Pacific Air Forces Command and support for U.S. and Allied forces in Southeast Asia.
Joint exercises carried out by ROC and U.S. forces over the years have involved all military services and every aspect of Taiwan's defense. The two countries are prepared to cooperate as they did in World War II should aggression affect their vital interests in the East Asian and Pacific area. Most junior and many senior officers of the Armed Forces have attended advanced schools of the U.S. defense establishment.
What kind of fighter is the free Chinese?
General Barnes has answered that question with the opinion that he is "highly motivated, well trained and disciplined. He is dedicated to the defense of Taiwan and his government. He has proved his ability to use and maintain the military equipment provided him."
Although the Americans helped rebuild the physical structure of the free Chinese Armed Forces, the restructuring of courage and morale was never necessary. The military forces which followed Generalissimo Chiang to Taiwan did so in good order and for the purpose of carrying on the struggle.
The leadership of Chiang Kai-shek remains the great inspiration of the free Chinese Armed Forces. Every private and seaman knows of the Generalissimo's interest in his welfare. No detail of military administration is too small for him, and no command problem too big. He has lost battles; he has never lost a war.
Once the armies of Chiang Kai-shek were referred to as aging. That was in the early days on Taiwan, when the island-born were without military experience. Most of those who were conscripted to fight for the Japanese during the 50-year occupation of the island never returned.
Today the armies of free China are young and 85 per cent composed of island-born young men who are ready to fight and die to prevent their own enslavement or that of loved ones under Communist tyranny. With the Generalissimo still firmly in command, the defenses of Chinese freedom have never been in better hands.